The price of anarchy, a measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, has been successfully analyzed in a diverse array of models over the past five years. The overwhelming majority of this work has studied optimization problems that sought an optimal way to allocate a fixed demand to resources whose performance degrades with increasing congestion. While fundamental, such problems overlook a crucial feature of many applications: the intrinsic coupling of the quality or cost of a resource and the demand for that resource. This coupling motivates allowing demand to vary with congestion, which in turn can lead to "the tragedy of the commons"-severe inefficiency caused by the overconsumption of a shared resource.
on the p norms for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞; our main results are as follows.
• For a natural "prize-collecting" objective function, the price of anarchy in multicommodity networks with variable demand is no larger than that in fixed-demand networks. Thus the inefficiency arising from the tragedy of the commons is no more severe than that from routing inefficiencies.
• Using the p norm with 1 < p < ∞ as a cost aggregation function can dramatically increase the price of anarchy in multicommodity networks (relative to additive aggregation), but causes no such additional inefficiency in single-commodity networks.
• Using the ∞ norm as a cost aggregation function can dramatically increase the price of anarchy, even in single-commodity networks. If attention is restricted to equilibria with additional structure, however-structure that is ensured by distributed shortest-path routing protocols-then using the ∞ norm does not increase the price of anarchy relative to additive aggregation.
Introduction
The Price of Anarchy and Variable Demand. The price of anarchy [24] -formally defined as the worst-case ratio between the objective function values of a Nash equilibrium and of an optimal solution-is an increasingly popular measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior. Over the past five years, the price of anarchy has been successfully analyzed in a diverse array of applications, including scheduling (see [14] and the references therein), routing (see [31] and the references therein), facility location [37] , network design [2, 3, 16] , resource allocation [22] , and other networking games [4, 19, 21] . Most of these previous works have identified natural classes of noncooperative games in which the price of anarchy is provably small; hence, selfish behavior results in only a modest loss of efficiency in these games. The overwhelming majority of this work studied optimization problems of the following sort: given re-sources whose performance degrades with increasing congestion, allocate a fixed demand for the resources in an optimal way. While obviously fundamental, such problems overlook a crucial feature of many applications: the intrinsic coupling of the quality or cost of a resource and the demand for that resource. Put differently, we expect the demand for an uncongested resource to be relatively high, and that this demand will fall as the resource becomes more congested and expensive. Allowing the demand for a resource to vary inevitably gives rise to a tradeoff between two different quantities: the number of users that benefit from the resource, and the quality of the resource (which degrades as more and more users benefit from it). We next illustrate this tradeoff with a stark, famous example: the tragedy of the commons [20] .
The Tragedy of the Commons. The tragedy of the commons typically refers to a strategic scenario with a shared resource that is effectively destroyed by overconsumption. In lieu of the traditional bovine example [20] , we will illustrate this idea in a network routing context.
Consider a large but fixed population of agents who are each considering traversing a link from a node s to a node t. Suppose that if an x fraction of the population makes the trip, then each of the itinerant agents incurs a cost of c(x) but reaps a benefit of 1. (Agents that stay home receive zero benefit and cost.) Suppose further that we instantiate the cost function as c(x) = x d for d large. Then the net benefit of making the trip is always nonnegative, even if the link is fully congested, and we expect the entire population to travel to t, resulting in zero net benefit for all.
Given dictatorial control of the population, we could implement a far superior outcome by detaining an fraction of the population; this would result in a 1 − fraction of the population enjoying a net benefit of nearly 1 (for d large). In other words-and this is the tragedy of the commons-the fact that the final fraction of the population insists on making the trip congests the shared resource to the point that none of the population extracts any net benefit from it.
In all previous works on the price of anarchy of "selfish routing", agents were not permitted to refuse to travel-put differently, the amount of traffic in the network was exogenous (fixed), rather than endogenous as in the above example. In the above single-link network, there is of course no inefficiency when the amount of traffic is fixed (there is only one feasible solution). This brings us to the first goal of this paper.
(1) Quantify the inefficiency that arises from allowing the demand for a resource to vary with its congestion.
Bottleneck Links and Nonlinear Aggregation
Functions. Allowing the demand for resources to vary with their congestion illuminates a second issue with most existing studies of the price of anarchy: the standard way of aggregating the costs of different resources in a player's strategy is inappropriate for some important applications, including many of those with variable demand.
To motivate this point, we recall the definition of congestion games [28] . In a congestion game, there is a ground set of elements (resources), and players' strategies are subsets of this ground set. Each element has a cost that is a function of its congestion-the number of players that select strategies containing it. For example, in selfish routing, the edges of the network form the ground set, and the strategies of a player are paths from a source vertex to a destination vertex. The cost of a player's strategy in a congestion game is given by an aggregation function of the costs of the elements in the strategy.
Almost all of the aforementioned work on the price of anarchy concerns classes of congestion games. All of these studies save two [1, 6] have a key assumption in common, however: that the aggregation function is linear. In fact, with one exception [33] , these papers assume that the aggregation function is additive-that the cost of a strategy is simply the sum of the costs of the elements it contains. (Although in several, such as the scheduling results surveyed in [14] , all strategies are singletons and hence no aggregation function is needed.) We emphasize that while numerous previous works have incorporated p norms into the objective functionwhich only affects the objective function values of equilibria, as opposed to the set of equilibria-only [1, 6] have used them as aggregation functions.
While additive aggregation functions are arguably the most natural ones, they are not well suited for all applications. For instance, when analyzing the performance of a communication network with a variable amount of traffic, a key performance metric is the achievable throughput along a path, which is controlled by its bottleneck (most congested) link; see e.g. Keshav [23] . In fact, the studies of Qiu et al. [27] and Akella, Chawla, and Seshan [1] , both of which tried to adapt theoretical results for selfish routing to more faithful models of the Internet, singled out the choice of the additive aggregation function over the bottleneck link metric as a key disconnect between selfish routing and the traditional concerns of the networking community.
The bottleneck link metric corresponds to using the ∞ norm as the aggregation function. Banner and Orda [6] point out that the ∞ norm is the natural aggregation function in many additional applications. For example, in wireless networks, the transmission capability of a path is constrained by the node with the smallest lifetime, as determined by its remaining battery power and the amount of traffic that it must send [10] . The ∞ norm also arises when robustness to bursty traffic [5] or to growing demand [38] is a priority. For further discussion and examples, see [6] . Determining the price of anarchy with nonlinear aggregation functions, and in particular with the ∞ norm, is therefore essential to understanding the consequences of selfish behavior in the above applications. This is the second goal of this paper.
(2) Analyze the price of anarchy in fixed-and variabledemand congestion games with nonlinear aggregation functions, and in particular with the ∞ aggregation function.
Our Results. In this paper, we initiate the study of the price of anarchy in congestion games with variable demand and with broad classes of nonlinear aggregation functions. We focus on selfish routing in single-and multicommodity networks, and on the p norms for
For the first goal (1), we augment the basic selfish routing model so that each player has a fixed benefit of making the trip. If the player can travel from its source to its destination incurring cost below this benefit, it makes the trip; otherwise, it does not. This augmented model has been extensively studied in the transportation science literature (see e.g. [17] ), where the traffic is said to be elastic.
As discussed at the beginning of the paper, with elastic traffic there are two quantities to optimize: we would like to maximize the benefit of the players, but also to minimize the cost they incur. To study the price of anarchy, we must aggregate these two quantities into a single objective function. The most natural ways to accomplish this-such as maximizing the consumer surplus, defined as the total benefit minus the total cost-result in mixed-sign objective functions. As is typical of approximation measures, non-trivial bounds on the price of anarchy for such objective functions are possible only under very strong assumptions. For example, in the single-link network above, the consumer surplus of the noncooperative equilibrium is 0, while an optimal solution has strictly positive consumer surplus (even if the link has cost c(x) = x).
On the other hand, mixed-sign objectives in optimization can often be transformed, in a nonapproximation-preserving way, into natural same-sign objectives (see e.g. [18] and the references therein). Indeed, we show that for the usual additive aggregation function and the "prize-collecting" objective of minimizing the lost benefit plus the sum of the costs incurred, there is no tragedy of the commons. Formally, we prove that the worst-possible price of anarchy in multicommodity networks with elastic traffic-specified by an arbitrary continuous distribution of the benefits of traveling-and cost functions in a set C is no more than that of networks with a fixed amount of traffic and cost functions in C. As a consequence, the price of anarchy in multicommodity networks with linear cost functions and arbitrary benefit distributions is at most 4/3 [32] ; if the cost functions are polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and degree at most d, the price of anarchy in such networks is O(d/ log d) [30] . Thus, for this prizecollecting objective, the worst-possible inefficiency that arises from variable demand has no greater magnitude than that arising from routing inefficiencies.
For the second goal (2), we prove matching positive and negative results about the price of anarchy of selfish routing with p aggregation functions. On the negative side, we give examples in Section 4.1 that demonstrate the following.
• For every 1 < p ≤ ∞, there is a family of twocommodity networks with linear cost functions and inelastic traffic in which the price of anarchy grows polynomially with the network size. (Cf. the p = 1 case, where the price of anarchy is at most 4/3 in networks with linear cost functions, inelastic traffic, and an arbitrary number of commodities [32] .) The "bicriteria bound" of [32] also fails to hold.
• For the ∞ norm, there is a family of singlecommodity networks with linear cost functions and inelastic traffic in which the price of anarchy grows polynomially with the network size, and in which the bicriteria bound of [32] does not hold.
We also achieve the following matching positive results in Sections 4 and 5.
• For every 1 < p < ∞, the price of anarchy in singlecommodity networks with the p norm is no worse than that in the p = 1 case. (E.g., is at most 4/3 for linear cost functions, O(d/ log d) for boundeddegree polynomials, and so on.) The bicriteria bound of [32] also holds in such networks.
• For the ∞ norm and a natural subclass of equilibria, which we call subpath-optimal, the price of anarchy in single-commodity networks is no worse than that in the 1 case. The bicriteria bound of [32] also holds for this subclass of equilibria.
These positive results hold for networks with inelastic traffic (Section 4) and, under an additional technical condition, with elastic traffic as well (Section 5).
In particular, these results imply that the inefficiency of selfish routing with the p norm with p > 1 is provably larger in multicommodity networks than in single-commodity ones. This separation stands in contrast to the provable equivalence of single-and multicommodity networks for the price of anarchy under the 1 norm [12, 30] . Indeed, all previously known proof techniques for bounding the price of anarchy of selfish routing (for the 1 norm) [11, 12, 13, 26, 30, 32, 36] in no way referred to the number of commodities of a network, nor to any combinatorial structure whatsoever. These proof techniques for the 1 case therefore appear to be necessarily incapable of extending to the p case with p > 1-a new, fundamentally combinatorial proof technique is required. We give such a technique in Section 4.
Finally, while our positive result for a subclass of equilibria in the ∞ norm is reminiscent of analyses of the best equilibrium (the "price of stability") [2, 3, 12] , it is much stronger in the following sense. While studying the best equilibrium typically cannot be justified without allowing some centralized intervention [2] , we show that subpath-optimal equilibria are in fact the "natural" outcome of decentralized optimization from a networking perspective. Specifically, we show that if an equilibrium is computed by a distributed shortest-path routing protocol, then it will automatically be subpath-optimal.
Further Related Work. While we are not aware of any previous work that focused on the price of anarchy with variable demand or with general nonlinear aggregation functions, there are a few papers related to the goals of the present work. First, Vetta [37] considered profit-maximization facility location games, auctions, and a variant of selfish routing. These games have both benefits and costs, and Vetta [37] considered a mixed-sign objective that is related to the consumer surplus. As noted above, approximation results are hard to come by with mixed-sign objective functions; because of this, Vetta [37] could only deduce non-trivial bounds on the price of anarchy under strong conditions. For facility location games, Vetta [37] proved that the price of anarchy is 2 only in the special case of all-zero costs. Similarly, the price of anarchy of profit-maximization selfish routing is bounded only when the benefits of routing are so large than an optimal solution routes all of the traffic; this assumption effectively rules out the tragedy of the commons a priori. Chau and Sim [11] deduced similar conclusions for selfish routing with a mixed-sign cost-minimization objective. The present paper sacrifices the mixed-sign objective for a prizecollecting one, but in exchange proves bounds on the price of anarchy without any assumptions on the relative magnitudes of the costs and benefits of a game.
Finally, as alluded to earlier, two recent papers studied aspects of selfish routing with the bottleneck link metric. First, Akella, Chawla, and Seshan [1] studied the price of anarchy under this metric for a variant of selfish routing with edge capacities and a maximization objective, but only obtained bounds on the price of anarchy that depend polynomially on the network size or on the ratio between the maximum and minimum edge capacities. Second, Banner and Orda [6] also recently studied selfish routing with the ∞ norm. However, the results of [6] primarily concern the existence and computation of equilibria, as well as the price of stability for an objective function that we do not consider in this paper. Lastly, this paper considers the "nonatomic" selfish routing model introduced by Wardrop [39] , where all players are assumed to control a negligible fraction of the overall traffic, whereas [1, 6] consider "atomic" selfish routing with a finite set of players.
The Model
Instances. In this section we describe a model of selfish routing that includes elastic traffic and a potentially nonlinear aggregation function. By a selfish routing instance, we mean a triple (G, Γ, c) made up of the following ingredients. First, G = (V, E) is a directed network with sources s 1 , . . . , s k ∈ V and sinks t 1 , . . . , t k ∈ V . Second, Γ is a vector of nonincreasing, continuous functions indexed by source-sink pairs (or commodities) i; Γ i models the distribution of the benefits of travel for the traffic of commodity i, and is assumed to be defined on the population [0, R i ], where R i ∈ [0, ∞) is the size of the population. Assuming that Γ i is nonincreasing amounts to ordering players according to their benefit of participating. Finally, c is a vector of nonnegative, continuous, nondecreasing cost functions, indexed by E.
Paths and Flows. For a network G, let P i denote the s i -t i paths of G and let P = ∪ k i=1 P i . A flow is a vector f indexed by P. For a fixed flow f , we use r i to denote the amount r i = P ∈P f P of traffic of the ith commodity that is routed by f . We always assume that the flow represents those most interested in traveling, so the r i units of traffic correspond to the subset [0, r i ] of the entire population [0, R i ]. A flow is feasible for (G, Γ, c) if r i ≤ R i for all commodities i.
For a flow f , let f e = P ∈P : e∈P f P denote the amount of traffic using the edge e. The cost of an edge e with respect to f is c e (f e ). If P is a path containing the edges e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m and f is a flow, then the cost c P (f ) of a path P with respect to f is c e1 (f e1 ), . . . , c em (f em ) for some aggregation function · . In the traditional selfish routing model, · is the sum function. In this paper, we will allow · to be any p norm · p with 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, where, by definition,
(Since we will only be taking the norm of nonnegative vectors, we omit the usual absolute value signs from these formulae.) We will sometimes call such an aggregation function a path norm. Nash Flows. Intuitively, a flow is at Nash equilibrium (or is a Nash flow) if no player can do better by changing its mind-be it by switching paths or by switching whether or not to participate. Mathematically, we have the following definition.
Definition 2.1 A flow f that is feasible for (G, Γ, c) is at Nash equilibrium if:
(a) for every commodity i and paths P, P ∈ P i with
(b) for every commodity i, the common cost c i (f ) of all s i -t i flow paths is equal to Γ(r i ).
Part (a) of Definition 2.1 is the usual condition that no player should be able to decrease its cost by switching paths. For part (b), first note that if f satisfies part (a), then c i (f ) is well defined-if f P > 0 and f P > 0 with P, P ∈ P i , then c P (f ) = c P (f ). Part (b) then asserts that all participants enjoy benefit at least equal to their cost (since Γ(a) ≥ Γ(r i ) = c i (f ) for all a ∈ [0, r i ]), and similarly that all non-participants would incur at least as much cost as benefit if they did participate (since Γ(a) ≤ Γ(r i ) = c i (f ) for all a / ∈ [0, r i ]). Existence of Nash flows can be established in a number of ways; for example, it is a consequence of the very general results of Schmeidler [34] .
Proposition 2.2 Every instance (G, Γ, c) admits at least one Nash flow.
In some parts of this paper, Nash flows will not be unique. In these cases, we will be interested in bounds on the performance of all of the Nash flows of an instance.
Remark 2.3
In Section 4 we will focus on instances with inelastic traffic. Such instances can be modeled with elastic traffic by defining the functions Γ to be sufficiently large everywhere. In Section 4 we will adopt the more direct approach of defining an instance with inelastic traffic via a triple (G, r, c), where the amount of traffic r i routed by each commodity is now exogenous. The definition of a Nash flow is then merely part (a) of Definition 2.1.
No Tragedy of the Commons with Elastic
Traffic For our first main result, we will show that the worstpossible inefficiency arising from the tragedy of the commons has no greater magnitude than that arising from the routing inefficiencies of selfish traffic. We begin with a discussion of objective functions and the price of anarchy in Section 3.1 before proceedings to the proof of this result in Section 3.2.
Preliminaries
As noted in the Introduction, in an instance (G, Γ, c) with elastic traffic there are two natural desiderata for a flow f : the cost P c P (f )f P that f incurs should be small, while the benefit i ri 0 Γ(x)dx reaped should be large. As the single-link network in the Introduction demonstrates, no approximation bound is possible if one of these quantities is subtracted from the other, unless benefits are assumed to be large relative to costs as in Chau and Sim [11] and Vetta [37] . We therefore study the combined cost CC(f ) of a flow f , defined as the cost added to the lost benefit:
This objective is inspired by the "prize-collecting" objectives that have been extensively studied in approximation algorithms; see, for example, the survey of Goemans and Williamson [18] for further background. One could also analogously consider "combined benefit"-the benefit earned plus the cost not incurred-but we believe this to be a less natural objective than the combined cost. With the objective function now set, an optimal flow for an instance is simply one that minimizes the combined cost over all feasible flows. The price of anarchy ρ(G, Γ, c) of an instance (G, Γ, c) is defined as the largest-possible ratio CC(f )/CC(f * ), where f is a Nash flow and f * is an optimal flow. Note that this definition makes sense even when Nash flows are not unique.
We will call instances with inelastic traffic and the additive aggregation function basic instances. The price of anarchy is well understood in such instances. Since we will only be studying models that generalize basic instances, our "holy grail" will be upper bounds on the price of anarchy that match those for basic instances.
We next review the known upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy in basic instances; simple exam-ples [32] show that such bounds must be parameterized by the allowable edge cost functions. Toward that end, define the anarchy value α(C) of a non-empty set of cost functions C to be:
The anarchy value of C is essentially the worst-possible price of anarchy in a two-node, two-link network where one link has a constant cost function and the other link has a cost function in C. Thus α(C) lower bounds the price of anarchy of basic instances with cost functions in C, assuming only that C contains all of the constant cost functions. Looking ahead toward the next two sections, we note that this lower bound arises only from networks of parallel links, and that all of the p norms coincide in such networks. Thus α(C) lower bounds the price of anarchy with respect to all p norms, even when restricting attention to (single-commodity) networks of parallel links.
The following are known for basic instances [12, 30] . First, the price of anarchy of a (multicommodity) instance (G, r, c) with cost functions in a set C is at most α(C). Second, the value of α(C) is known for many natural sets C: if C contains only linear or concave functions, then α(C) ≤ 
Bounding the Price of Anarchy with Elastic
Traffic The goal of this section is to prove that α(C), the known upper bound on the price of anarchy for basic instances with cost functions in C, also upper bounds the price of anarchy of multicommodity instances with arbitrary elastic traffic and cost functions in C, provided we use the combined cost objective function (3.1) and the 1 aggregation function.
We note that there is a naive reduction from networks with elastic traffic to networks with inelastic traffic-achieved by adding a new s i -t i link for each i to represent the traffic not routed-but this reduction produces a network with cost functions that depend on the distributions Γ (which in turn control the price of anarchy of the network). We will see that this dependence is unnecessary-the price of anarchy in instances with elastic traffic is determined only by the edge cost functions, and is independent of the distributions Γ.
Our proof is a generalization of the "variational inequality" proof technique of Roughgarden [30] and Correa, Schulz, and Stier Moses [12] to the elastic traffic case. Variational inequalities were first introduced as a tool to study traffic equilibria by Smith [35] and Dafermos [15] ; for elastic traffic, the appropriate variational inequality is the following.
Proposition 3.1 If f and f
* are Nash and feasible flows for (G, Γ, c), respectively, then
where r i = P ∈Pi f P and r * i = P ∈Pi f * P .
Proposition 3.1 can be proved directly or via the convex programming approach pioneered by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [7] . For details see, for example, Nagurney [25] . We can now prove the main result of this section. (We omit all proofs from this extended abstract. All proofs appear in the full version of the paper.)
is an instance with elastic traffic and cost functions in the set C, then the price of anarchy ρ(G, Γ, c) is at most α(C).
Remark 3.3 Theorem 3.2 also holds more generally for the nonatomic congestion games studied in [33] .
Remark 3.4
The very first line of the proof of Theorem 3.2-which rewrites the first term of CC(f * ) as an equivalent sum over edges-already crucially uses properties of the 1 path norm. Indeed, we will see in the next section that only restricted versions of Theorem 3.2 can hold for the p path norms with p > 1, even with inelastic traffic.
Remark 3.5 The proof of Theorem 3.2 proves a stronger statement, that permits better upper bounds on the price of anarchy in instances where Nash flows do not route all of the traffic of every commodity. We defer further elaboration until the full version.
Nonlinear Path Norms
In this section we study the price of anarchy with nonlinear aggregation functions-in particular, with the p path norms with 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. We will see that the price of anarchy of selfish routing behaves differently in each of the three cases of p = 1, p ∈ (1, ∞), and p = +∞. In Section 4.1 we exhibit two examples demonstrating the negative results promised in the Introduction; these examples will sculpt our goals for the rest of the section. In Section 4.2 we identify a natural subclass of Nash flows for the ∞ norm, justify them from a networking perspective, and prove optimal bounds on their inefficiency in singlecommodity networks. In Section 4.3 we treat p norms with p < ∞; while this case is technically more challenging than that of the ∞ norm, we will be rewarded with bounds on the inefficiency of arbitrary Nash flows in single-commodity networks.
Throughout this section, we consider only instances with inelastic traffic. In this context, our objective function is the cost, defined for a flow f feasible for an instance (G, r, c) as C(f ) = P ∈P c P (f )f P . This is the first term of the combined cost (3.1). The price of anarchy ρ(G, r, c) is then defined in the usual way.
We will generalize the positive results of this section to networks with elastic traffic in Section 5.
Motivating Examples
We now give the two examples promised in the Introduction. The first shows that good bounds on the price of anarchy of selfish routing with the p norm cannot be achieved in multicommodity networks, even in networks with linear cost functions and inelastic traffic, provided p > 1.
Example 4.1 Fix an p norm with 1 < p ≤ ∞ and consider the two-commodity network shown in Figure 1 . For a parameter k ≥ 1, there are k internally disjoint paths s 1 → v i → w i → t 1 (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}). Edges (v i , w i ) have the cost function c(x) = x; other edges in these paths cost 0. There are k − 1 cross edges (w i , v i+1 ) (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}), each with cost 0. The second source s 2 is connected to v 1 with a zero-cost edge, and w k is connected to t 2 with a zero-cost edge. Finally, there is a direct s 2 -t 2 edge with constant cost c(x) = (r 2 + 1)k 1/p , where r 2 is the traffic rate of the second commodity, which is a function of k and p that we will define shortly. (If p = ∞, we interpret 1/p as 0.) The traffic rate r 1 of the first commodity is k.
First, consider the flow f * that routes the traffic of the first commodity evenly across the k s 1 -t 1 paths, and routes the second commodity's traffic on the direct s 2 -t 2 link. The cost of f * is k + r 2 · (r 2 + 1)k 1/p . Next, by the choice of the cost of the direct s 2 -t 2 link, the following flow f is at Nash equilibrium: route the first commodity's traffic evenly across the s 1 -t 1 paths and the second commodity's traffic on the s 2 -t 2 path containing all of the cross edges. The cost of f is k · (r 2 + 1) + r 2 · (r 2 + 1)k 1/p . The price of anarchy in the network is at least C(f )/C(f * ); choosing r 2 so that r 2 (r 2 + 1) = k 1−1/p , this ratio is Ω(k (1−1/p)/2 ). Since n = O(k), this ratio grows polynomially in the network size for every fixed p > 1.
Finally, note that doubling the traffic rates increases the cost of the optimal flow by only a constant factor, so the bicriteria bound of [32] -stating that a Nash flow is no more expensive than an optimal flow at double the traffic rates, even with arbitrary cost functions-does not hold in this network.
Our second example shows that even in singlecommodity networks with linear cost functions and inelastic traffic, there are no good bounds on the price of anarchy for the ∞ norm.
Example 4.2 Suppose we modify the network of Example 4.1 by removing s 2 , t 2 , and edges incident to them. This yields the network of Figure 2 . There is a unique s-t path that contains all of the cross edges; call it the zigzag path. With respect to the ∞ norm, the flow f that routes all traffic on the zigzag path is at Nash equilibrium-all s-t paths have cost k with respect to f and the ∞ norm-and has cost k 2 . On the other hand, routing traffic evenly among the k threehop paths provides a flow with cost k. (This flow is also at Nash equilibrium.) The price of anarchy in this network is therefore at least k.
As with Example 4.1, the bicriteria bound of [32] also fails in this example. Examples 4.1 and 4.2 justify restricting our attention to single-commodity networks and, for the ∞ norm, to natural subclasses of equilibria.
4.2
The ∞ Norm and Subpath-Optimal Nash Flows We next consider single-commodity networks with the ∞ norm. Example 4.2 shows that additional restrictions are needed to prove a good bound on the price of anarchy. We will require only a modest extra condition on Nash flows, stating the Nash flow condition The flow f is a subpath-optimal Nash flow if whenever an s-t path P ∈ P with f P > 0 includes a vertex v, the s-v subpath of P has ∞ norm d(v).
To see that a subpath-optimal Nash flow is indeed a Nash flow, take v = t. Note also that the zigzag Nash flow of Example 4.2 is not subpath-optimal, while the optimal flow is. Finally, notions similar to Definition 4.3 were also proposed, for different purposes and without any networking justification, in [1, 6] . The next proposition is meant to suggest that no extra notion of coordination or centralized intervention is required to justify subpath-optimal Nash flows-indeed, processes that result in a Nash flow automatically ensure the subpath-optimality condition. In the interests of space, we will state and discuss the proposition somewhat informally.
Proposition 4.4 A fixed point of a distributed shortest-path routing protocol is a subpath-optimal Nash flow.
By a distributed shortest-path routing protocol, we mean a Bellman-Ford-type shortest-path algorithm-in networking jargon, a "distance vector protocol" such as OSPF (see e.g. [23] ). Proposition 4.4 assumes that the cost functions {c e (·)} are used for edge lengths, and that path lengths are evaluated using the ∞ norm. Such a shortest-path routing protocol naturally computes not just shortest s-t paths, but also shortest s-v paths for all intermediate vertices v, which is precisely the subpathoptimality condition. We defer further details until the full version. For more details on distributed shortestpath routing protocols and on results along the lines Proposition 4.4, see Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [8] .
We now prove bounds on the inefficiency of subpath-optimal Nash flows. Examples 4.1 and 4.2 show that our proof techniques must make crucial use of both the single-commodity and the subpath-optimal assumptions. Since all previous proof techniques for bounding the price of anarchy of selfish routing (with the 1 path norm) worked equally well for single-commodity networks and the much more general nonatomic congestion games [11, 12, 13, 26, 30, 32, 33, 36] , we will require an intrinsically more combinatorial argument.
We first prove a lemma that identifies a type of "minimal cut" with respect to a subpath-optimal Nash flow. Loosely, we will then treat the edges crossing this cut as a network of parallel links, which will enable us to prove both bounds on the price of anarchy as well as an analogue of the bicriteria bound of [32] .
In the statement of the lemma, we use the notation δ + (S) (δ − (S)), where S is a set of vertices, to denote the edges with tail (head) in S and head (tail) outside S.
Lemma 4.5 Let (G, r, c) be a single-commodity instance with inelastic traffic and the ∞ path norm. Let f be a subpath-optimal Nash flow for (G, r, c) in which all flow paths of f have cost c(f ), and let S be the set of vertices reachable from the source s via edges with cost strictly less than c(f ). Then:
(c) c e (f e ) = c(f ) for all e ∈ δ + (S) with f e > 0;
Theorem 4.6 Let (G, r, c) be a single-commodity instance with cost functions in C, f a subpath-optimal Nash flow under the ∞ norm, and f * a feasible flow. Then C(f ) ≤ α(C) · C(f * ).
As discussed in Section 3.1, the upper bound in Theorem 4.6 is the best possible. Simple examples [32] also show that following bicriteria bound is also optimal.
Theorem 4.7 Let (G, r, c) be a single-commodity instance and f a subpath-optimal Nash flow under the ∞ norm. If f * be feasible for (G, 2r, c), then C(f ) ≤ C(f * ).
The p Norms
In this section we extend Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 to the p path norms with p < ∞.
The proofs for the p < ∞ case are more involved than those for the p = ∞ case. In particular, Lemma 4.5-which essentially reduced the problem of bounding the inefficiency of a Nash flow to that of bounding its inefficiency across a single, well-behaved cut-has only weak analogues for the p norms with p < ∞. Specifically, we will need to bound the cost of a Nash flow across many cuts, and then aggregate the results into a bound on the overall cost of the flow. Because we work with fairly general path norms, the aggregation step is somewhat delicate. On the other hand, since Nash flows under the p norm with p < ∞ are automatically subpathoptimal, we can prove bounds on their cost without any extra restrictions.
Theorem 4.8 Let (G, r, c) be a single-commodity instance with the p norm (p < ∞) and cost functions in C. If f and f * are Nash and feasible flows for (G, r, c), respectively, then C(f ) ≤ α(C) · C(f * ).
Theorem 4.9 Let (G, r, c) be a single-commodity instance with the p norm (p < ∞). If f and f * are Nash and feasible flows for (G, r, c) and (G, 2r, c), respectively, then C(f ) ≤ C(f * ).
Remark 4.10 Theorems 4.8 and 4.9 can be generalized to all path norms that satisfy certain symmetry properties, but we not aware of any compelling norms that satisfy these properties other than the p norms.
No Tragedy of the Commons with Nonlinear
Path Norms In this final section we investigate whether or not the positive results of Sections 3 and 4 can be combined. Our answer will be somewhat incomplete. In particular, we will answer in the affirmative only when a Nash flow sends at least as much traffic through the network as an optimal flow. Simple examples-including networks of parallel links, and by definition all networks that illustrate the tragedy of the commons-satisfy this condition. Unfortunately, examples related to Braess's Paradox [9, 29] show that it does not hold for arbitrary single-commodity networks. We do not know how to analyze the price of anarchy for instances with elastic traffic and nonlinear path norms in which this technical condition does not hold.
Proposition 5.1 Let (G, Γ, c) be a single-commodity instance with elastic traffic, the ∞ norm, and cost functions in the set C. If f and f * are subpath-optimal Nash and optimal flows for (G, Γ, c), respectively, that satisfy P f P ≥ P f * P , then C(f ) ≤ α(C) · C(f * ).
Proposition 5.2 Let (G, Γ, c) be a single-commodity instance with elastic traffic, the p norm (p < ∞), and cost functions in the set C. If f and f * are Nash and optimal flows for (G, Γ, c), respectively, that satisfy P f P ≥ P f * P , then C(f ) ≤ α(C) · C(f * ).
